JIAHON Group · JIAHON Insights · Perspective | Surface Fairness, Part 2

Who Gets the Bill: The Root of Short-Termism Is That Decision-Makers Don’t Pay

The median tenure of a large US company’s CEO is under five years, yet the payoff from redundancy may not show for ten; Taiwan holds a major election roughly every two years, and the actuarial projection for the Labor Insurance Fund shows its balance turning negative in 2031. Short-termism isn’t necessarily a matter of who’s worse; often it’s simply that the people who decide don’t pay the bill. This is the second part of “Surface Fairness”: the first part asked when the bill arrives; this one asks who gets it, from managers, democratic elections and seemingly steadier central planning, to why, as the world factory recedes and what was long united divides, one buyer must now carry every anti-static item, and how one-stop sourcing can be done without becoming another single source.

Published by JIAHON Insights | Written by Marcus (Senior Vice President) | October 2, 2026

In brief

This is the second half of Surface Fairness. The first part asked when the bill for a decision arrives; this one asks where it is sent. We call it the bill’s address: back to the person who decided, to someone else, to the next office-holder, or to the next generation. People who receive their own bills tend to look far ahead; people who can mail them elsewhere tend not to, however clever they are. Nassim Taleb calls the cure “skin in the game”; the Code of Hammurabi wrote it into law nearly 3,800 years ago.

Short-termism is easy to find in democracies. William Nordhaus described the political business cycle in 1975. Taiwan’s Labor Insurance Fund is projected to turn negative in 2031, while government top-ups have grown from TWD 20 billion in 2020 to about TWD 130 billion a year; the US Congressional Budget Office projects federal debt held by the public rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 175% in 2056. State-led planning in China can look steadier (China holds about 85% of global solar supply-chain capacity and accounted for six in ten electric cars sold worldwide in 2025), but its bills arrive at later cut points: land-sale revenue fell 52% from 2021 to 2025, a 10-trillion-yuan local-debt swap followed in 2024, and the Great Leap Forward famine remains the starkest case of planning without feedback. Both systems turn short-sighted wherever decision-makers do not pay.

Meanwhile the factory floor is dividing. Taiwan’s approved investment in mainland China fell from 83.8% of its outward investment in 2010 to about 3.8% in 2025, as new plants spread to the United States, Mexico, Japan, Germany and India. Smaller, scattered plants mean one buyer must now handle every anti-static or cleanroom item. A one-stop supplier is worth having when it works as one window, many sources: one order and one invoice for the buyer, qualified backup sources and stock behind it, and the integrator paying when something fails. Buyers should run a barbell: consolidate the long tail through one window, and keep second sources for the few critical items.

This is the second part of “Surface Fairness.” The first part, “Surface Fairness: change the time cut point and the answer changes” (in Chinese), asked when the bill arrives: the same decision gives a different answer at a different time cut point. This part asks who gets the bill: if the person who decides doesn’t have to pay, even a clever person becomes short-sighted. Together the two parts make one ruler: for every decision, ask twice: when is it paid, and who pays.

1. Who gets the bill: the root of short-termism

Short-termism often isn’t because people are foolish; it’s because the bill went to someone else’s house.

From Edmund Burke in 1790 and Hayek in 1945, to Jane Jacobs and James Scott, and Taleb today, a line of thought more than two centuries long has kept criticizing the same thing: people trusting too much in their ability to plan everything from the top down. Applying this line to modern organizations yields five common ailments: over-optimization, extreme specialization, centralized management, rule by experts, and institutional risk transfer.

The five ailments look different, but they have one root: the decision-maker takes the benefit and sends the bill to someone else. Taleb calls the cure skin in the game, putting your own skin into the bet; the Taiwanese edition of his book is titled The Asymmetry Trap [1]. The idea is older than any management theory: nearly 3,800 years ago, Article 229 of the Code of Hammurabi stated that if a builder’s house collapses and kills the owner, the builder shall be put to death [2].

This article frames it as a second ruler, called the bill’s address. The first part’s time cut point asks when the bill arrives; the bill’s address asks who gets it. There are just four addresses: back to the decision-maker, to someone else, to the next office-holder, or to the next generation. People whose bills come back to their own house naturally look far ahead; people who can send bills elsewhere, however clever, tend to be short-sighted.

Figure 1: The bill’s address, the same bill sent to four places. Back to yourself (founders, farmers who work their own fields: plant wrong and you go hungry; the Code of Hammurabi: house collapses and kills the owner, the builder pays with his life): looks far ahead. Someone else (credit rating agencies: rating fees booked first, investors pay when ratings are wrong; presales housing: developers collect first, risk stays with buyers): tends to be short-sighted. The next office-holder (managers: S&P 500 CEO median tenure 4.8 years in 2022; officials: achievements during their term, debt left to successors): tends to be short-sighted. The next generation (pensions: Labor Insurance actuarial projection, fund balance negative in 2031; national debt: US debt held by the public reaching 175% of GDP in 2056): tends to be short-sighted. Part 1 asked “when” the bill arrives; this part asks “who” gets it.

Managers: costs during the term, benefits after it

Managers are a common example. According to Equilar, the median tenure of S&P 500 CEOs was 6 years in 2013 and had fallen to 4.8 years by 2022 [3]. Redundancy, inventory and backup are costs on this year’s financial statements, while the benefit doesn’t show until the year something goes wrong.

Toyota is a clear case. After the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, Toyota required suppliers to hold 2 to 6 months of chips depending on lead time [4]. In normal times this looked like waste; ten years later, in early 2021, carmakers worldwide fell into a chip shortage, and the Reuters article’s headline was “How Toyota thrives when the chips are down.” From 2011 to 2021 is roughly two median tenures apart: the term that paid mostly didn’t see the return.

Credit rating agencies: fees booked first, losses mailed later

Credit rating agencies are another address. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) final report of 2011 was severe: the three major rating agencies were “key enablers” of the financial meltdown. From 2000 to 2007, Moody’s rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities AAA; in 2006 alone it stamped 30 AAAs every working day, and 83% of the mortgage securities rated AAA that year were ultimately downgraded [5]. Rating fees were booked at cut point one; losses from wrong ratings were mailed to investors at cut point two.

Figure 2: Of every 100 mortgage securities Moody’s rated AAA in 2006, 83 were later downgraded. 30 AAAs stamped every working day (2006); nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities rated AAA from 2000 to 2007; by comparison, in early 2010 just 6 private US companies were rated AAA. Rating fees: booked at cut point one → rating agency; losses from wrong ratings: cut point two → investors. Source: FCIC, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011, p. xxv.

Table 1: Five ailments, in the world and at the purchasing desk

AilmentIn the worldAt the purchasing deskWho gets the bill
Over-optimizationZero inventory, single origin; the 2021 chip shortage cut global vehicle production by an estimated 7.7 million [6]Comparing unit prices alone, no safety stockThe line on the day it stops
Extreme specializationEach person understands a single step, and can’t adapt when conditions changeA buyer who knows just one or two items; not enough once the plant shrinksThe buyer who takes over
Centralized managementThe world factory, too big to failEach item bet on a single factoryEvery customer when the source fails
Rule by expertsRating agencies paid even when wrong [5]Purchasing KPIs that look at unit price, not at line stops and reworkProduction and quality
Risk transferPresales housing risk left with buyersAnnual price cuts push cost onto suppliers, returned as quality problems (see Part 1)Downstream customers

2. Democracies: votes every few years, bills issued later

People often say democracy is better; but looking at nations’ books, many democratic politicians are short-sighted too.

The economist William Nordhaus proposed the “political business cycle” in 1975: incumbents seeking re-election tighten early in the term and stimulate before the election, lowering unemployment before the vote while the inflation cost comes after [7]. Nixon, mentioned in Part 1, followed this script: privately he said controls wouldn’t work, yet announced a freeze in August 1971; the payment cut point was scheduled after the 1972 election [8].

Taiwan: the Labor Insurance bill keeps getting mailed forward

Taiwan’s clearest example is Labor Insurance. The current actuarial report published by the Ministry of Labor in January 2025 projects the Labor Insurance Fund’s accumulated balance turning negative in 2031, three years later than the previous report’s 2028; this projection already includes government top-ups totaling TWD 387 billion over 6 consecutive years through 2025 [9]. The top-ups keep growing: from TWD 20 billion in 2020 to about TWD 130 billion a year in 2024 to 2026, totaling TWD 517 billion over seven years [10].

The bill changed address: a gap that could have been closed by adjusting premium rates and benefit conditions is instead filled by the budget, paid by all taxpayers. Premium rates, benefits and claim age: every one of these levers needs someone willing to take the criticism before an election. Local elections are on November 28, 2026, the presidential election in early 2028 (expected January), and local elections again in 2030 [11]; the projected 2031 falls after all three. This isn’t one party’s problem: as long as elections come before the bill, whoever governs faces the same incentives. The Ministry of Labor also stresses that the government bears ultimate payment responsibility for Labor Insurance [9]; the bill doesn’t disappear; it just changes address. National Health Insurance, discussed in Part 1, has the same structure.

Figure 3: Labor Insurance, top-ups rise year after year while the projected “balance turns negative” year keeps moving later. Government top-ups (TWD 100 million): 200 (2020), 220, 300, 550, then 1,300 a year for 2024–2027 (2027 dashed as budget proposal); elections marked (local, presidential alternating); actuarial projections: 2028 (2021 report), 2031 (2024 report). Top-ups total TWD 517 billion for 2020–2026. The Ministry of Labor says the government bears ultimate payment responsibility, and “balance turns negative” is merely a calculation under actuarial assumptions. Sources: Ministry of Labor (2025-01-21) actuarial report; CNA (2025-08-21); Economic Daily News (2026-02-01); ETtoday (2026-08-17); Central Election Commission.

The United States and Germany: debt and gaps

The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) long-term projections of 2026: federal debt held by the public is about 101% of GDP in 2026, rising to 175% by 2056 [12]. The two parties take turns governing, and the bill keeps getting mailed forward. Germany mails it another way: local governments’ self-assessed public investment backlog reached a record EUR 231.2 billion in 2026 [13]; in March 2025, the Bundestag amended the Basic Law to create a special fund of up to EUR 500 billion over 12 years for infrastructure and climate protection [14]. Years of suppressed public investment are then made up by borrowing through a constitutional amendment; the next generation pays.

3. Does central planning look steadier? The same question, at a different cut point

At cut point one, this observation has merit; at cut points two and three, the bill is still there.

What long-term planning can do

Compared with elections every few years, China’s state-led long-term planning (which many call a planned economy) does have its strengths. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 2026 report says China holds about 85% of global solar supply-chain capacity and 80% of lithium battery supply-chain capacity, with PV wafers as high as 95% [15]; in 2025, China sold more than 13 million electric cars, six in every ten EVs sold worldwide [16]; high-speed rail operating length grew from 37,900 km in 2020 to 50,400 km at the end of 2025 [17]. These industries need policies that keep betting for ten or twenty years, which is why many people feel planned economies are steadier: election cycles struggle to do this.

The same system’s bills

But the line of thought at the start of this article criticizes exactly central planning. Hayek’s 1945 paper “The Use of Knowledge in Society” pointed out that the knowledge society needs is scattered across countless people’s on-the-ground experience, and no central body can gather it all [18]. Scott documented Germany’s “scientific forestry”: replacing mixed natural forest with uniform single-species spruce, the first generation grew well and the second declined markedly; after two or three rotations of pure spruce, site class fell by one or two grades, a 20% to 30% production loss, and in severe cases German gained a new word, Waldsterben, “forest death” [19]. The first generation lived off the soil capital the old forest had built up.

China’s land finance is a modern version of the same structure. Revenue from transferring state-owned land use rights peaked at CNY 8.71 trillion in 2021 and fell to CNY 4.15 trillion in 2025, down 52% [20]; Evergrande defaulted in December 2021 and was ordered liquidated by the Hong Kong High Court in January 2024, and Country Garden defaulted in October 2023 [21]; in November 2024, the central government launched a 10-trillion-yuan swap of local hidden debt, cutting the hidden debt localities had to absorb before 2028 from CNY 14.3 trillion to 2.3 trillion [22]. Presales money was collected first and land transfer fees went into local budgets first; whether the homes get built and whether prices fall is a bill sent to homebuyers and the next officials.

Figure 4: The same system, two sets of books. Left, achievements of long-term planning (global share): solar supply-chain capacity about 85% (IEA, 2026); lithium battery supply-chain capacity about 80% (IEA, 2026); EV sales in 2025, six in ten worldwide sold in China. Right, the bill that arrived late, land transfer revenue (CNY trillion): 8.41 (2020), 8.71 (2021), 6.69 (2022), 5.80 (2023), 4.87 (2024), 4.15 (2025), down 52% from 2021; November 2024: a 10-trillion-yuan local hidden debt swap. Cut point one shows the achievements; cut points two and three show the bill. Sources: IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2026, Global EV Outlook 2026; China Ministry of Finance fiscal revenue and expenditure, 2020–2025.

History’s bills were heavier. For the famine during the Great Leap Forward (about 1959 to 1961), scholarly estimates of excess deaths vary enormously, from about 15 million to more than 45 million; commonly cited figures include Ashton et al.’s nearly 30 million (1984), Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone at about 36 million, and Frank Dikötter’s at least 45 million [23]. It was the most tragic bill of top-down grand planning that didn’t listen to the ground.

Conversely, the stretch when China truly took off began precisely with letting go. On November 24, 1978, 18 farmers in Xiaogang Village, Anhui, risked pressing their red thumbprints to privately divide collective land among households [24]. Xiaogang wasn’t the first place to do this, but the central government later endorsed the practice: from 1982 to 1984 it promoted it in the “Document Number One” it issued at the start of each of those years, and by the end of 1983, 93% of production teams nationwide had adopted this responsibility system [24]. This is the Chinese version of Hayek’s paper: the people on the ground know more than the center.

In Foreign Affairs in 2015, Taleb and Treverton proposed five main sources of national fragility: centralized government, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, lack of political variability, and no history of surviving shocks. They wrote that centralization reduces deviations and makes things seem to run more smoothly, but magnifies the consequences when deviations do occur [25]. Earlier, in 2011, Taleb and Blyth wrote that complex systems whose volatility is artificially suppressed become extremely fragile while showing no visible risk on the surface [26]. In Part 1’s terms, this is the ten o’clock policy: every small fire was put out, and the fuel stayed in the forest. The transparency buffer model JIAHON Insights proposed in “Will the AI bubble burst or slowly deflate?” (in Chinese) says the same thing.

Putting the two side by side

Britain offers another side. On September 23, 2022, the Truss government announced a large tax-cut package; the gilt market was immediately thrown into turmoil, and on September 28 the Bank of England announced purchases of long-dated gilts; she announced her resignation on October 20, after just 49 days in office [27]. The noise of democracy is sometimes the small fire: wrong decisions get burned off quickly.

Table 2: Democracy and planning, the same question at two cut points

ItemDemocraciesChina’s long-term planning
How it looks at cut point oneNoisy, slow, policies often reversed; many small firesSteady, willing to invest long-term: about 85% of global solar supply-chain capacity, six in ten EV sales worldwide
Who gets the billThe next office-holder and the next generation: Labor Insurance projected negative in 2031; US debt held by the public reaching 175% of GDP in 2056Homebuyers, local finances, the next officials: land transfer revenue down 52% from 2021 to 2025; a 10-trillion-yuan hidden debt swap
How it correctsElections and markets: Truss’s tax-cut package roiled the gilt market and she left after 49 daysTop-down; Xiaogang was an exception endorsed after the fact
Shared rootMost decision-makers have terms or rotate, and the bill arrives after the term

So “democracy is better” and “planning is steadier” each answer half the question. Both systems become short-sighted, because in both, most decision-makers have terms: democratically elected officials, and China’s regularly rotated local officials; the difference is where the bill is sent and how long until it arrives. Democracy has many small fires but can’t put out the slow burn either, as Labor Insurance and US debt show; planning has few small fires, but fuel may keep piling up, as land finance shows. JIAHON Insights endorses neither system; we ask just two things: when does the bill arrive, and who gets it.

4. What is long united must divide: the world factory recedes

“The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.” This is the opening of Chapter 1 of Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and it describes supply chains in recent years [28].

The past thirty years were “united”: the world concentrated production in China. By 2023, China’s manufacturing value added was about 28% of the global total [29]; at its peak, Foxconn’s Zhengzhou plant had about 350,000 people assembling, testing and packing iPhones on one campus [30]. The benefits of concentration came at cut point one: scale, low unit prices, high efficiency.

The bill arrived at cut point two. According to an AlixPartners estimate from September 2021, the chip shortage cost carmakers worldwide 7.7 million vehicles of production and USD 210 billion in revenue that year [6], the first of the five ailments at the start: over-optimization. Toyota’s 2 to 6 months of chip inventory, mentioned earlier, looked like waste in normal times and was insurance that year.

Now is the time of “dividing.” Investment in China approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs was 83.8% of Taiwan’s total outward investment in 2010, fell to 11.4% in 2023, 7.5% in 2024 and a mere 3.8% or so in 2025 [31]; from 2023, Taiwan’s investment in the United States exceeded its investment in China for the first time in more than twenty years [32]. The amount invested in China rebounded 20% in 2024, which the ministry explained was mainly acquisitions of foreign companies with existing China operations [31].

New plants are spreading to consumer markets. TSMC’s Kumamoto fab opened in February 2024, its Arizona fab began volume production in Q4 2024, and its Dresden fab broke ground in August 2024 [33]; on the server side, Foxconn is building a GB200 server plant in Guadalajara, Mexico; Foxconn and Wistron are building plants for NVIDIA around Houston and Dallas, Texas respectively, Wistron’s Fort Worth plant opened in July 2026, Wiwynn’s Texas plant opened in September 2026, and Pegatron’s Georgetown, Texas plant is expected to operate in 2026 [34]. In a 2025 McKinsey survey, 38% of companies planned to reduce their supply chain footprint in China, and 43% planned to shift more of it to the United States within three years [35]; about a quarter of Apple’s iPhones were assembled in India in 2025 [36].

Figure 5: What is long united must divide. Share of approved investment in China in Taiwan’s total outward investment: 83.8% (2010), 11.4% (2023), 7.5% (2024), 3.8% (2025); the 2024 increase came mostly from acquisitions of foreign companies with China operations. Where it went: United States (from 2023, Taiwan’s US investment exceeds China; TSMC Arizona volume production Q4 2024; Texas: Foxconn Houston, Wistron (opened 2026), Wiwynn (opened 2026), Pegatron (expected 2026)); Mexico (Foxconn Guadalajara GB200 plant, announced 2024); Japan (TSMC Kumamoto opened February 2024); Germany (TSMC Dresden broke ground August 2024); India (about a quarter of iPhones assembled in India, 2025). Sources: MOEA Department of Investment Review; SEF; AmCham Taiwan; TSMC; NVIDIA; Reuters; Wistron; Taipei Times; Bloomberg.

These new plants have one thing in common: they are far from the scale of Zhengzhou’s hundreds of thousands of workers, but there are more of them, spread across several countries. As factories divide, demand becomes fragmented, and purchasing feels it first.

5. One buyer, carrying every anti-static item

It used to be that one item could support one buyer; now one buyer has to carry a whole category.

In the world factory era, a single campus might have tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people. Cleanroom garments, cleanroom shoes, wrist straps, heel straps, anti-static bench mats, finger cots: each was used in volumes large enough for a buyer to manage just one or two items: finding factories, comparing prices, negotiating and chasing deliveries, all supported by scale.

This is JIAHON’s direct observation at customer sites: once factories split across countries, each plant has fewer people, but not one fewer item. The volume of each item shrinks, and a single item can no longer support a dedicated buyer; now it’s common for one buyer to be responsible for all anti-static items, or even all cleanroom items. The work of selection and acceptance falls on the same person; “How to choose cleanroom garments, cleanroom shoes and anti-static slippers” (in Chinese) summarizes the specifications and acceptance points for these items.

Figure 6: After the factory splits, one buyer carries a whole category (illustrative). Before, the world factory: buyer A (cleanroom garments, cleanroom shoes), buyer B (wrist straps, heel straps), buyer C (anti-static bench mats, finger cots); one item could support a buyer. Now, small plants spread across countries: country A, B and C each with 1 buyer handling the same 6 items; each item’s volume is smaller, and not one item fewer. Bar thickness represents single-item volume, proportions assumed. Sourcing, onboarding, price comparison, acceptance and reconciliation for each supplier don’t shrink because volume is small.

More work, spent on smaller amounts

In purchasing terms, these items are “tail spend.” McKinsey research finds that tail spend accounts for 80% to 90% of a company’s purchased items but just 10% to 20% of spend; Kearney estimates tail suppliers are 60% to 80% of all suppliers yet no more than 10% to 20% of spend [37]. In other words, more work is spent on smaller amounts.

The problem is that each supplier’s fixed workload doesn’t shrink because volume is small. The UK’s The Manufacturer published research by Manchester Business School with MRO distributor RS Components: a company spending GBP 100,000 on MRO goods has a total procurement cost of about GBP 300,000; for every 1 spent on goods, the process costs about another 2 [38]. APQC’s 2026 benchmark puts the cost of processing a single purchase order at about USD 13.85 for top-quartile companies (25th percentile), USD 29.59 at the median, and USD 54.50 for the bottom quartile (75th percentile) [39]. In “Part VIII | Stop comparing prices blindly!” (in Chinese), JIAHON also used a conservative scenario: a 300-person electronics plant with 50 MRO purchase orders a month at TWD 1,500 of manual process cost each adds up to TWD 900,000 a year in hidden cost.

Applied to a post-split small plant (illustrative, figures assumed): one buyer, 30 items, 12 suppliers

  • Buying separately: 1 purchase order per supplier per month → 12 × 12 months = 144 per year.
  • At APQC’s median of USD 29.59 each → 144 × 29.59 ≈ USD 4,261 per year.
  • Through one window: 1 per month → 12 × 29.59 ≈ USD 355 per year.
  • This covers just the cost of raising orders, excluding acceptance, reconciliation, onboarding and audits.

Raising orders doesn’t cost much; what’s really expensive is 12 suppliers’ separate lead times, quality issues, minimum order quantities and reconciliations, and in a small plant all of these fall on the same buyer. “Part VII | Stood up by a new supplier again?” (in Chinese) listed four hurdles before a new supplier is added: credit consumption, getting to know each other, credit checks and internal administration; costs are incurred before any order is placed.

Factories are dividing; someone has to combine demand

Smaller volume has another direct consequence: not reaching minimum order quantities (MOQ). Small plants end up buying more and holding stock, or accepting higher unit prices. In “Part II | How one-stop MRO reduces stockout risk and MOQ roadblocks” (in Chinese), JIAHON described how an integrated supplier works: combining different customers’ demand in the back end to clear MOQs together, and together securing safety stock commitments from manufacturers. As factories divide, someone has to combine demand again: long divided must unite, long united must divide, turning one more layer down in the supply chain.

6. One window, not one source

A common question about one-stop sourcing: handing everything to one company, isn’t that a single source?

It’s the right question. Of the five ailments at the start, the first is over-optimization: betting on one, keeping no backup, saving in normal times and suffering when things go wrong. If “one-stop” means one window with a single factory behind it, that’s one window, one source: convenient, and fragile.

This article calls the workable approach one window, many sources: one window for the buyer, with multiple qualified sources and stock behind it. Separating window from source gives four combinations:

  • Many windows, many sources: enough sources and redundancy, but every supplier needs onboarding, price comparison, acceptance and reconciliation; the bill for redundancy goes to the buyer.
  • One window, many sources: one order, one invoice; multiple qualified factories plus stock behind it. The cost of redundancy and the bill when something goes wrong are carried by the integrator.
  • Many windows, one source: three trading companies, but the goods come from the same origin; it looks diversified, but if the origin fails, all three fail together.
  • One window, one source: one window, one factory; simple in normal times, no fallback when something goes wrong.

Figure 7: One window, many sources: one window is not one source. A 2×2 matrix with windows (many → one) and sources (one → many). Many windows, many sources: bill to the buyer; 5+ suppliers, each to onboard, compare, chase, accept and reconcile. One window, many sources (JIAHON’s approach): one order, one invoice; multiple qualified factories plus stock behind it, and the integrator pays when something goes wrong. Many windows, one source (hidden single source): three trading companies, one origin; if it fails, all three fail. One window, one source (one break stops the line): simple normally, no fallback.

One window, many sources works because of the bill’s address. An integrator handling dozens of a customer’s items may lose the whole customer if any one goes wrong; the bill comes back to its own house, so it looks far ahead. This is also the commitment revised in Part 1: in warranty disputes, JIAHON takes responsibility, but always with the true root cause attached. Who bears the cost when terms are unclear is discussed in “Why keep a settled claim confidential?” (in Chinese).

JIAHON has a rule of its own: one-stop sourcing doesn’t sell those items; it sells saving customers purchasing hassle. Saving hassle is the product; items are merely the material for delivering it. So how well one-stop sourcing works is measured not by the number of items but by the one-stop fulfillment rate and consistency of delivery.

7. What this means for the midstream supply chain

Core of this article: the world is dividing; what purchasing has to decide is which things to combine and which to keep separate.

The purchasing barbell

Taleb’s barbell strategy places resources at both ends: one end extremely safe, the other keeping options open, avoiding a middle ground that looks prudent but fails on both counts [40]. In purchasing, that means:

  • Long-tail items: consumables that are 80% to 90% of items and 10% to 20% of spend go to one window; one window, many sources replaces dozens of sets of onboarding and reconciliation.
  • Critical materials: the few items whose failure stops the line, judged by each plant’s specifications and line, keep a second source and safety stock.
  • Avoid the middle: finding one supplier per item and managing each separately looks diversified, but one buyer watching dozens of suppliers becomes a single point of failure.

Figure 8: The purchasing barbell, combine the long tail and keep critical materials separate. Long-tail items (80% to 90% of items, just 10% to 20% of spend) → one window (one window, many sources). Critical materials (the few items whose failure stops the line, judged by each plant’s specs and line) → second source plus safety stock. Avoid the middle ground: one supplier per item, each managed separately; one buyer watching dozens of suppliers becomes the single point of failure. Sources: McKinsey (2018); Kearney; barbell strategy from Taleb’s Antifragile.

Three questions about the bill’s address

Before the next annual price cut negotiation, sample request, warranty signing or supplier change, ask three questions:

  • 1. Who gets this decision’s bill? The bill for annual price cuts and no-charge samples was calculated in Part 1, “Surface Fairness” (in Chinese): first sent to the supplier, then returned as quality.
  • 2. Where does redundancy sit, and who pays for it? With the buyer or with the supplier? Redundancy that sits with the buyer is paid for with the buyer’s time.
  • 3. Who pays when something goes wrong? Root cause reports, replacements and warranty responsibility belong at the front of the contract, not negotiated after something happens.

You don’t have to convince everyone

Taleb also observes that a stubborn minority often sets the standard for the majority. People who keep kosher make up less than 0.3% of US residents, yet nearly every drink on the market appears to be kosher, because for everyone else, either is fine [1]. Purchasing is the same: you don’t need to convince your whole department; just keep insisting on root cause reports for critical items, and suppliers have a reason to make it standard practice.

One sentence for buyers: combine the long tail, keep critical materials separate, and for every decision, first ask who gets the bill. “Part X | Integrated service lowers total cost of ownership” (in Chinese) breaks this account into three parts: time spent comparing and requesting quotes, the administration of reconciliation and acceptance, and trial and error from buying the wrong specification.

8. Let the decision-maker pay

Low-cost long-term planning means letting the decision-maker pay the bill.

Taleb opens Antifragile with: “Wind extinguishes a candle and energizes fire” [40]. Volatility threatens what is fragile and feeds what is robust.

The Lindy effect says that the longer a practice has existed, the longer it can be expected to keep existing [41]. The general store, gathering what a place needs in one window, has existed for centuries; concentrating the world’s production in one place has been united for a mere twenty or thirty years. No one can say whether the world factory will keep dividing; but the need for someone to recombine fragmented demand probably won’t change.

Part 1 said: look at anything at least three times. This part adds: each time you look, ask who gets the bill.

  • Short-termism often isn’t because people are foolish; it’s because the bill went to someone else’s house.
  • The bill’s address: back to yourself, to someone else, to the next office-holder, to the next generation. Of the four, the one that comes back to your own house is what makes the decision-maker look far ahead.
  • Democracy’s noise is small fires; planning’s steadiness may be piled-up fuel; for both systems, ask who gets the bill.
  • The world is dividing, and someone has to combine demand: one window, not one source.

FAQ

What is the “bill’s address”?
Every decision has a bill. Part 1, “Surface Fairness,” asked when the bill arrives (the time cut point); the bill’s address asks who gets it: the decision-maker, someone else, the next office-holder or the next generation. People whose bills come back to their own house look far ahead; people who can send them elsewhere, however clever, tend to be short-sighted.

Are politicians in democracies more short-sighted?
There are studies and examples to compare: Nordhaus proposed the “political business cycle” in 1975; according to the January 2025 actuarial report, Taiwan’s Labor Insurance Fund’s accumulated balance turns negative in 2031, with government top-ups growing from TWD 20 billion in 2020 to about TWD 130 billion a year in 2024 to 2026; the US Congressional Budget Office projects debt held by the public rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 175% in 2056. But democracies also correct quickly: Truss’s tax-cut package roiled the UK gilt market and she left office after 49 days.

Is China’s planned economy steadier?
At cut point one, long-term planning has produced results: China holds about 85% of global solar supply-chain capacity, and six in ten EVs sold worldwide in 2025 were sold in China. But the same system has bills that arrive late: revenue from transferring state-owned land use rights fell from CNY 8.71 trillion in 2021 to 4.15 trillion in 2025, and a 10-trillion-yuan local hidden debt swap was launched in 2024; for the famine during the Great Leap Forward, scholarly estimates of deaths range from about 15 million to more than 45 million. JIAHON Insights endorses no system; it asks just when the bill arrives and who gets it.

Why does one buyer now manage every anti-static item?
Production is moving from concentrated to dispersed: approved investment in China fell from 83.8% of Taiwan’s outward investment in 2010 to about 3.8% in 2025, with new plants spreading to the United States, Mexico, Japan, Germany and India. Each plant is smaller and each item’s volume smaller, so a single item can’t support a dedicated buyer, and one buyer handles all anti-static or cleanroom items.

Isn’t one-stop sourcing just a single source?
It depends on whether it’s “one window, many sources”: one window for the buyer, with multiple qualified sources and stock behind it, and the integrator bearing the cost of redundancy and the consequences when something goes wrong. Long-tail items suit one window; critical materials whose failure stops the line should still keep a second source and safety stock: the purchasing barbell.

References

[1] Taleb, N. N. (2018). Skin in the Game; Taiwanese edition The Asymmetry Trap, Locus Publishing, 2018 (trans. Lo Yao-tsung). Kosher example: observant people are less than 0.3% of US residents. locuspublishing.com

[2] Code of Hammurabi, Articles 229 and 230 (L. W. King translation, Yale Avalon Project): if a builder’s house collapses and kills the owner, the builder shall be put to death; if it kills the owner’s son, the builder’s son shall be put to death. avalon.law.yale.edu

[3] Equilar (2023-07-21). CEO Tenure Rates (S&P 500 CEO median tenure: 6 years in 2013, 4.8 years in 2022). equilar.com

[4] Reuters (2021-03-09). How Toyota thrives when the chips are down (after 2011, suppliers required to hold 2 to 6 months of chips depending on lead time); Toyota (2016-03-11). Five Years on (RESCUE supply chain database). reuters via yahoo.com; global.toyota

[5] Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC, 2011). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, conclusions p. xxv (the three major rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown; 83% of mortgage securities Moody’s rated AAA in 2006 were ultimately downgraded). govinfo.gov

[6] AlixPartners (2021-09-23). Chip shortage to cost carmakers USD 210 billion in revenue and 7.7 million vehicles of production in 2021. alixpartners.com

[7] Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42(2): 169–190. academic.oup.com

[8] Abrams, B. A. & Butkiewicz, J. L. (2017). The political economy of wage and price controls: evidence from the Nixon tapes. Public Choice 170(1): 63–78; UDaily (2017-02-02): in February 1971, Nixon privately said comprehensive peacetime wage and price controls would not work. ideas.repec.org; udel.edu

[9] Ministry of Labor (2025-01-21). Current Labor Insurance actuarial report completed (4.5% return assumption; including government top-ups through 2025, the year the accumulated balance turns negative is 3 years later than the previous report; government top-ups of TWD 387 billion over 6 consecutive years; the government bears ultimate payment responsibility); Commercial Times (2025-01-21): moved from 2028 to 2031. mol.gov.tw; ctee.com.tw

[10] CNA (2025-08-21). Government top-ups to the Labor Insurance Fund (from TWD 20 billion in 2020; TWD 517 billion over 7 years); Economic Daily News (2026-02-01): top-ups of TWD 130 billion each in 2024 to 2026; ETtoday (2026-08-17): the 2027 central government budget allocates TWD 130 billion to the Labor Insurance Fund. cna.com.tw; money.udn.com; ettoday.net

[11] United Daily News (2025-10-31). Central Election Commission: 2026 local elections set for November 28. udn.com

[12] Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2026-09-24). Projections of Deficits and Debt Under Alternative Scenarios (debt held by the public as a share of GDP: 101% in 2026, 175% in 2056); data from The Long-Term Budget Outlook Data: 2026 to 2056. cbo.gov

[13] KfW / Difu (2026-06-17). KfW-Kommunalpanel 2026 (German local governments’ self-assessed public investment backlog at a record EUR 231.2 billion). difu.de

[14] German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb, 2025-03-28). Grundgesetzänderung für Verteidigung und Sondervermögen (passed by the Bundestag on 2025-03-18 and Bundesrat on 2025-03-21; EUR 500 billion special fund for infrastructure and climate protection over 12 years). bpb.de

[15] IEA (2026). Energy Technology Perspectives 2026 (China holds about 85% of global solar supply-chain capacity, 80% of lithium battery supply-chain capacity and 95% of PV wafers). iea.org

[16] IEA (2026). Global EV Outlook 2026 (China sold more than 13 million EVs in 2025, six-tenths of the global total). iea.org

[17] Xinhua (2026-01-04). High-speed rail operating length rose from 37,900 km to 50,400 km (2020 → 2025). news.cn

[18] Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530. econlib.org

[19] Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like a State; Taiwanese edition, Rye Field, 2023 (trans. Liang Chen). Chapter 1: pure spruce forests declined markedly in the second generation, with 20% to 30% production loss after two or three rotations (citing Plochmann); “forest death” (Waldsterben). cite.com.tw

[20] China Ministry of Finance. Fiscal revenue and expenditure, 2020–2025 (revenue from transferring state-owned land use rights: CNY 8,705.1 billion in 2021; 6,685.4 billion in 2022; 5,799.6 billion in 2023; 4,869.9 billion in 2024; 4,151.8 billion in 2025). ndrc.gov.cn; mof.gov.cn

[21] HKFP (2024-01-29). Hong Kong High Court orders Evergrande liquidation; Reuters (2023-10-25): Country Garden’s dollar bond declared in default for the first time. Evergrande was cut to restricted default by Fitch in December 2021. hongkongfp.com; reuters via yahoo.com

[22] Chinese government website (2024-11-08). NPC Standing Committee approves a CNY 6 trillion increase in local government debt limits; Xinhua (2024-11-08): directly adding CNY 10 trillion of debt resolution resources, cutting hidden debt localities must absorb before 2028 from CNY 14.3 trillion to 2.3 trillion. gov.cn; news.cn

[23] Ashton, B. et al. (1984). Famine in China, 1958–61. Population and Development Review 10(4): 613–645 (nearly 30 million); Yang Jisheng, Tombstone (about 36 million); Dikötter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine (at least 45 million); scholarly estimates range from about 15 million to 46 million. jhu.edu; en.wikipedia.org

[24] People’s Daily (2018-12-12). On November 24, 1978, 18 farmers in Xiaogang Village pressed red thumbprints and divided land among households; People.cn (2018-12-10, first published in Farmers’ Daily): by the end of 1983, 93% of production teams nationwide had adopted this responsibility system; household contracting as a share of all responsibility systems was 97.8% at the end of 1983 and 98.9% at the end of 1984. people.com.cn

[25] Taleb, N. N. & Treverton, G. F. (2015). The Calm Before the Storm: Why Volatility Signals Stability, and Vice Versa. Foreign Affairs 94(1) (five sources of national fragility). foreignaffairs.com

[26] Taleb, N. N. & Blyth, M. (2011). The Black Swan of Cairo. Foreign Affairs 90(3) (complex systems with artificially suppressed volatility become extremely fragile while showing no visible risk). fooledbyrandomness.com

[27] UK House of Commons Library (2022-10-03). CBP-9624 (the Growth Plan of 2022-09-23); Bank of England (2022-09-28): temporary purchases of long-dated gilts from September 28; UK government: Truss in office 2022-09-06 to 2022-10-25. parliament.uk; bankofengland.co.uk; gov.uk

[28] Luo Guanzhong, revised and annotated by Mao Zonggang, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Chapter 1: “The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.” wikisource.org

[29] CSIS ChinaPower (updated 2025-11-25). China’s 2023 manufacturing value added of USD 4.66 trillion, 28% of the global total (World Bank data). csis.org

[30] The New York Times (2016-12-29). How China Built ‘iPhone City’ (about 350,000 workers at the Zhengzhou plant at peak); cited in MacRumors (2016-12-29). macrumors.com

[31] Ministry of Economic Affairs (2025-01-15, 2026-01-15). Approved outward investment and investment in mainland China statistics (the 2024 increase in China investment came mainly from acquisitions of foreign companies with existing China operations); SEF (2026-05-06): China investment was 83.8% of outward investment in 2010. moea.gov.tw; seftb.org

[32] AmCham Taiwan (2024-12). Taiwan’s Investment Focus Shifts Tides (in 2023, Taiwan’s investment in the US exceeded investment in China for the first time in over twenty years). amcham.com.tw

[33] TSMC press releases: JASM Kumamoto fab opening (2024-02-24), ESMC Dresden fab groundbreaking (2024-08-20); TSMC Arizona: N4 volume production began in Q4 2024. tsmc.com

[34] Reuters (2024-10-08): Foxconn building a GB200 server plant in Guadalajara, Mexico; NVIDIA (2025-04-14): plants with Foxconn in Houston and Wistron in Dallas; Wistron (2026-07-21): Fort Worth plant opened; Taipei Times (2026-09-18): Wiwynn Texas plant opened; Taiwan News (2025-10-08): Pegatron Georgetown, Texas plant expected to operate in 2026. reuters via yahoo.com; nvidia.com; wistron.com; taipeitimes.com; taiwannews.com.tw

[35] McKinsey (2025-12). Supply chain risk pulse 2025 (38% of respondents plan to reduce their supply chain footprint in China; 43% plan to shift more to the US within three years). mckinsey.com

[36] Bloomberg (2026-03-10). Apple Now Makes About 25% of iPhones in India After China Pivot (about 55 million units in 2025); reported by TechWire Asia (2026-03-12). bloomberg.com; techwireasia.com

[37] McKinsey (2018-06-06). Long tail, big savings (tail spend is 80% to 90% of purchased items but just 10% to 20% of spend); Kearney: tail suppliers are 60% to 80% of suppliers yet no more than 10% to 20% of spend. mckinsey.com; kearney.com

[38] The Manufacturer (2015-12-23). The true cost of MRO (Manchester Business School and RS Components research: GBP 100,000 of MRO goods, GBP 300,000 total procurement cost). themanufacturer.com

[39] APQC (2026-04). The $4 Million Procurement Gap (cost per purchase order: 25th percentile USD 13.85, median USD 29.59, 75th percentile USD 54.50). apqc.org

[40] Taleb, N. N. (2012). Antifragile; Taiwanese edition, Locus Publishing, 2013 (trans. Lo Yao-tsung), prologue: “Wind extinguishes a candle and energizes fire.” The barbell strategy is also from this book. locuspublishing.com

[41] Goldman, A. (1964-06-13). Lindy’s Law. The New Republic; Taleb generalized it as the “Lindy effect” in Antifragile. en.wikipedia.org

Note: This is an opinion article; cases and data come from public information from government agencies, international organizations, research institutions and media, with citations as listed in the references. Labor Insurance, debt and fiscal figures are calculations and statistics from the competent authorities; if new announcements are made, current data prevails. The article’s commentary on political and economic systems is JIAHON Insights’ analysis of “who gets the bill”; it does not represent support for or opposition to any political party, government or political system, does not constitute an accusation against any particular person or institution, and does not constitute investment advice.

License: This work is published by JIAHON Group. All rights reserved. Quotation and redistribution are permitted with proper attribution and a link to jiahon.com.tw. Commercial use, including but not limited to paid courses, reports or consulting services incorporating this content or its frameworks (including the “bill’s address” and “one window, many sources”), requires prior written authorization from JIAHON; contact us through our website for commercial licensing.

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