JIAHON Group · JIAHON Think Tank perspective | Surface Fairness, Part 1. Published by JIAHON Think Tank | Written by Marcus (Senior Vice President) | 1 October 2026 | jiahon.com.tw
A forest fire looks like a disaster on the day it burns and like a new forest ten years later; a frozen price looks like a kindness on the day it is set and, a few weeks later, means drowned chicks and empty shelves. The same event, looked at from a different time cut point, gives a different answer. This article starts from the question “and then what?” that the economist Thomas Sowell’s teacher kept putting to him, and uses forests, the chickens of 1973, Japan’s zombie firms and Taiwan’s National Health Insurance to take apart how “surface fairness” pushes the bill onto other people and into the future. It ends back in the mid-stream supply chain, with annual price-downs, free samples and warranties — and goes back to correct the promise JIAHON itself made in the previous article.
In Brief
As an undergraduate at Harvard, the economist Thomas Sowell was asked by his professor Arthur Smithies what would happen once the policy he favored took effect—and then what would happen after that. Most judgments stop at the first answer. This essay turns that question into a simple discipline we call time cut points: look at the same decision at three moments—when it happens, after one round of responses, and a generation later—and watch how often the verdict flips. Fairness that holds only at the first cut point is surface fairness.
A forest fire looks like a disaster on the day it burns; a year after Yellowstone’s 1988 fires, nearly a third of the plants in burned lodgepole-pine stands were pine seedlings, released from resin-sealed cones that open only above 45°C. The US Forest Service’s 1935 rule to put out every fire by 10 a.m. the next morning looked like protection and let fuel pile up for the fires no one could stop. Freezing prices in 1973 looked fair at the checkout and led poultry farmers to destroy about a million chicks. When Japanese banks kept insolvent “zombie” firms alive in the 1990s, their healthy rivals invested and hired less. Taiwan’s National Health Insurance keeps premiums and copayments low; the bill moves to hospitals, to the general budget—NT$60 billion of it in 2027—and to the future.
Sports offer a better model of fairness: rules—weight classes, handicaps, draft order—are set before the game, published, and applied to everyone; nobody changes the score after the whistle. In the mid-stream supply chain, annual price-downs, free samples and blanket warranties are all versions of a frozen price. We also revisit our own promise from the previous essay—that Jiahon would absorb warranty disputes—and add the condition that makes it work: we absorb the cost, and we always tell you the root cause.
This article is a sequel. “Paid Out, So Why Keep It Confidential?” looked at who bears the cost when the terms of a contract are not written clearly; this one puts the same question on a timeline: look at the same decision at a different point in time, and the cost falls on different people. “Four Pillars: Build Your Own Two First” said that “a single try is a roll of the dice; a lifetime is a probability”; time cut points are the other side of the same idea — look once and you see the surface, look three times and you see the whole.
Part 2: “Who Gets the Bill: The Root of Short-Termism Is That the Decision-Maker Does Not Pay” goes on to ask who the bill is “sent to”: if the person making the decision does not have to pay, however clever they are, they will be short-sighted.
1. And then what? — Three time cut points
Most judgments stop at the first answer.
The economist Thomas Sowell studied economics at Harvard. In one class, his teacher Arthur Smithies asked which policy he supported, and he eagerly described all the benefits the policy would bring. The teacher only asked: then what will happen? Sowell worked out the next step, and the teacher asked again: and after that? [1]
Years later, Sowell turned this questioning into a book, Applied Economics: Thinking Beyond Stage One, whose title means thinking past the first stage; the book’s dedication page names this very teacher. His central observation is that people do not act according to the good intentions of a policy; they act according to the costs and incentives the policy changes. So the real result of a decision often appears only at the second or third step, and the people who looked only at the first step have usually collected their applause and left.
This article turns that questioning into a measuring stick we call time cut points: look at the same event once at each of three points in time.
Cut point 1 — when it happens. The visible, direct result. Applause and criticism both gather here.
Cut point 2 — after one round of responses. People and firms adjust their behaviour to the new costs and incentives: stockpiling, exiting, switching materials, seeing the doctor more, investing less.
Cut point 3 — a generation later. The structure has changed shape: the forest has a different mix of trees, the industry has a different set of people, the system keeps a different set of books.
When something looks fair only at cut point 1, and by cut points 2 and 3 the bill has been handed to someone else, this article calls it surface fairness.
JIAHON Think Tank uses this measuring stick on itself. “Saudel’s Week” sealed five predictions before the typhoon arrived; after the typhoon passed, it came back to settle them one by one. None of the five came true; the original wording of the predictions was not changed by a single word, and the settlement was written up as it was — that is going back to reconcile the books at cut point 2.
Figure 1: Three time cut points — letting small fires burn and putting out every fire get opposite verdicts at each of the three cut points. A timeline across cut point 1 (when it happens), cut point 2 (after one round of responses) and cut point 3 (a generation later). Letting small fires burn (accepting the cost now): looks bad — the fire is burning and the forest is charred; turning point — cones split open and seeds fall to the ground; looks good — a new forest grows and there is less fuel. Putting out every fire (letting no fire burn): looks good — the fire is out and the trees are saved; turning point — dead branches and fallen leaves pile up year after year; looks bad — it becomes a fire no one can put out. Bottom line: fairness that holds only at cut point 1 is surface fairness.
2. One fire, three answers
A small fire is not the forest’s enemy; it is the forest’s maintenance.
The lodgepole pine is waiting for a fire
According to the US National Park Service, nearly 80% of the forest in Yellowstone National Park is lodgepole pine. It has a kind of cone sealed shut with resin, which melts only at temperatures above 45°C [2] — and up in the canopy, temperatures like that usually come only from a forest fire. The fire also clears the dead branches and leaf litter from the ground and opens up the dense canopy, letting sunlight reach the forest floor; the seeds fall at just that moment, and germinate.
In 1988 Yellowstone burned for a whole summer. The fires affected about 794,000 acres, 36% of the park’s area [3], and the news footage was harrowing. A survey a year later found that nearly a third of the plants in the burned stands were lodgepole pine seedlings [4]; of the park’s seven native hoofed animals, only the moose showed a decline after the fires, and no effect could be seen on grizzly bear numbers [2].
Cut point 1 shows fire, cut point 2 shows seeds, and cut point 3 shows a new forest.
Figure 2: The lodgepole pine is waiting for a fire — a cone sealed with resin opens only when fire comes. Nearly 80% of Yellowstone’s forest is lodgepole pine. Normal times: resin seals the cone, and the seeds are stored on the tree for many years. Fire arrives: above 45°C the resin melts and the cone can open. After the fire: the ground is cleared and sunlight gets through; the seeds fall and germinate. One year after the 1988 fires, nearly a third of the plants in the burned stands were lodgepole pine seedlings. Sources: US National Park Service (NPS); USDA Forest Service Fire Effects Information System (FEIS).
A forty-three-year experiment in putting out every fire
In the summer of 1910, a series of great fires in the American Northwest burned huge areas of forest [5]. The US Forest Service, then only a few years old, defined itself from that point on as a firefighting agency; in 1935 it set the “10 a.m. policy”: every wildfire was to be put out by ten o’clock on the morning after it was discovered [5][6][7].
At cut point 1 this looks entirely right: fewer fires, timber saved. At cut point 2, dead branches, fallen leaves and overcrowded young trees build up year after year, no longer cleared away by small fires. At cut point 3, once the fuel has piled up far enough and meets a dry season and strong winds, it burns into a fire no one can put out. US Forest Service researcher Calkin and colleagues put it bluntly in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2014: wildfire suppression succeeds 95% to 98% of the time, and precisely because that rate is so high, fires of greater intensity, faster spread and beyond any suppression are bound to come in the end [8].
From the 1960s, research steadily demonstrated the role of fire in forest ecology. In 1971 the Forest Service first relaxed its target to “control every fire within 10 acres”; in 1978 the 10 a.m. policy was formally abolished [9], and the agency moved to managing fire. One of the methods is called “prescribed burning”: deliberately setting small fires under controlled conditions to burn off the fuel first. A Taiwanese popular-science article has made the same point: treating every forest fire as a disaster to be put out not only holds back forest renewal, but also builds up too much fuel and ends up causing great fires [10].
The same structure holds in markets. The “transparency buffer model” that JIAHON Think Tank proposed in “Will the AI Bubble Burst or Slowly Deflate?” describes exactly this: continuous small corrections work like a pressure-release valve, turning energy that might build into a big explosion into small releases the market can absorb.
Here we need to be precise. The typical case of fuel build-up is the dry, low-elevation pine forests of the American West, which used to be swept by small fires every few years. For Yellowstone’s 1988 fires, the research conclusion is that drought and strong winds were the main causes, and that twentieth-century suppression policy did not noticeably change the forest’s original fire cycle [11]. So this article uses Yellowstone to talk about “after the fire,” not “before the fire.”
Figure 3: Timeline of the 10 a.m. policy — from putting out everything to prescribed burning; 1935 to 1978, 43 years of full suppression (timeline to scale, 10 years per division). 1910: great fires in the American Northwest; before 1935, the wish to suppress but not the manpower. 1935: the 10 a.m. policy, put out by ten the next morning. 1971: relaxed to controlling each fire within 10 acres. 1978: formally abolished, followed by managed fire and prescribed burning. 1988: the Yellowstone fires. 2026: full suppression back in dispute. Sources: USDA Forest Service RMRS-GTR-428; Forest History Society; Headwaters Economics; The Colorado Sun (24 August 2026).
3. The many can overcome Heaven, and Heaven, once settled, can break them
The Chinese saying that “man can conquer nature” originally had a second half.
In the “Biography of Wu Zixu” in the Records of the Grand Historian, Shen Baoxu sends word to Wu Zixu: he has heard that when men are many they can overcome Heaven, and that once Heaven has settled things, it too can break men. The Tang-dynasty commentator Zhang Shoujie explains in his Zhengyi commentary: with numbers and force, people can for a time overcome Heaven by violence; when Heaven sends down its calamity, the violent are broken all the same [12].
The Ministry of Education’s Dictionary of Chinese Idioms also glosses “the many overcome Heaven” as “man can conquer nature” [13]. Later generations remembered the first half and forgot the second. In this article’s terms: the first half is cut point 1, the second half is cut point 3.
The chickens of 1973
On 15 August 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced a 90-day freeze on wages and prices, and polls showed 75% of people in favour [14]. In June 1973 he froze prices again. This time, wholesale and retail chicken prices were frozen; the farmers’ own selling price was nominally outside the freeze, but with downstream prices frozen, nobody was willing to pay more. Feed was not frozen either, and its price kept climbing. Every chicken raised was a chicken lost. According to TIME at the time, poultry farms simply suffocated and drowned about a million chicks [15]; ranchers kept cattle on the range instead of sending them to market, and supermarket shelves were stripped bare [14].
These farmers were not bad people. With the selling price frozen and costs still rising, giving up raising chickens was the rational choice each poultry farm worked out for itself. Those who froze the prices collected the applause at cut point 1; the bill at cut point 2 was paid by farmers and consumers together.
Figure 4: A frozen selling price, an unfrozen cost — the chickens of 1973 and today’s annual price-downs are the same mechanism. Top row, US chickens in 1973: wholesale and retail chicken prices frozen by the government, so farmers could not sell higher; plus feed prices outside the freeze and rising all the way; so every chicken raised was a chicken lost, the selling price not covering the feed; the result each worked out for itself: about a million chicks suffocated and drowned, cattle kept off the market, shelves stripped bare. Bottom row, today’s annual price-downs in the supply chain: the selling price adjusted down by a fixed amount every year; plus raw materials and freight, with labour also rising, none of which follow the price-down; so every order is a little thinner, the selling price not covering cost; the result each works out for itself: switching materials, cutting inspection, shortening after-sales support, or simply exiting, leaving the suppliers most willing to cut corners. Bottom line: when the selling price is frozen and costs keep rising, exit is the rational choice each firm works out for itself — not bad people, just arithmetic.
Japan’s zombie firms
After Japan’s asset bubble burst in the early 1990s, many large banks’ own capital was in danger. To avoid booking losses, they used debt restructurings in name only to keep lending to firms that were already insolvent. The economists Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap called these companies, kept alive on life support, “zombie firms.”
Their 2008 study in the American Economic Review found that the more zombie firms an industry had, the more stagnant its job creation and destruction and the lower its productivity; the healthy firms’ profits were squeezed by the zombies, and instead of entering and investing, they held back [17]. Kashyap put it directly: elsewhere, when an industry takes a shock, many firms exit; in Japan, firms never exit [18].
Not letting fall what should fall is not letting small fires burn. At cut point 1, nobody loses their job and no bank admits a loss; at cut point 3, the whole industry is choked with dead wood, and the healthy trees cannot grow.
Ash turns into nutrients. A senior figure in the industry opened two yakiniku restaurants when he was young, and in the end closed both. On paper that was a loss; but what remained after closing them — the company entity, the premises, and a group of people willing to follow him — solved the hardest hurdle when he took on his next business: recruiting the first person, because nobody wants to work at a company with no colleagues. When you end something, what you need to count is not only how much you lost, but also what was left that you can take into the next venture.
4. Heaven helps those who help themselves: fairness at the health-insurance counter
Whoever pays the cost takes care.
“Heaven helps those who help themselves” is the opening line of Self-Help, by the nineteenth-century British writer Samuel Smiles [19]. The insurance industry wrote this principle into its policies long ago: many insurance products have a deductible, and one of its purposes is to make the person who claims feel a little of the pain themselves, and take a little more care day to day. The previous article, “Paid Out, So Why Keep It Confidential?”, was about exactly this kind of contract, in which you pay in advance to buy cover for the unexpected.
National Health Insurance is an insurance policy that all of Taiwan buys. On the surface it is very fair: everyone is enrolled, with coverage of about 99.9% [20]; registration is cheap and seeing a doctor is easy. The problem is that it makes the deductible very thin — the bill you can see at the counter is small, and the bill you cannot see has gone somewhere else.
Table 1: The National Health Insurance bill — the surface, and the view from another cut point
| The surface (cut point 1) | The view from another cut point |
|---|---|
| The premium rate stays at 5.17%: no rise in 2026, and none planned for 2027 [21][23] | Since 2023 the government has markedly expanded top-ups from the general budget: about NT$20 billion extra in 2026 [22], and NT$60 billion budgeted for 2027 [23]. The premium that does not rise is paid out of taxes instead |
| The NHI global budget grows every year and covers more people | In 2027 the global budget passes NT$1 trillion for the first time, about NT$55 billion more than in 2026; with the NT$60 billion top-up, the reserve at year end is estimated at about 2.3 months (statutory minimum 1 month) [23] |
| Registration is cheap, seeing a doctor is easy | People in Taiwan see a doctor about 15 times a year, against about 7 in advanced OECD countries (as stated by the head of the NHI Administration in 2023) [24] |
| However much you see the doctor, NHI pays | Within the same global-budget sector, as outpatient volume rises, the amount paid per point may be diluted; time-consuming, high-risk services such as emergency and critical care and surgery may not keep stable resources [25] |
| Administrative costs among the lowest in the world | On the 2016 budget, administrative costs were about NT$5.5 billion, less than 1% of total spending; but the administrative budget is funded separately from the general budget and has for years not grown with the scale of the insurance — it is low because it has been squeezed [26] |
Figure 5: Where the National Health Insurance bill goes — the one seen at the counter is small; the unseen ones are split among hospitals, tax bills and the future. Left, doctor visits per person per year (bars to scale): Taiwan about 15, advanced OECD countries about 7, about 2.1 times (15 ÷ 7 ≈ 2.14). Right, from “the NHI bill: premium rate 5.17%, no rise” to four destinations. Counter — registration and copayment (visible): the small amount paid at each visit, the one bill anyone sees. Hospitals — point values may be diluted (unseen): as outpatient volume in the same global-budget sector rises, emergency and critical care and surgery may not keep their resources. Tax bills — general-budget top-ups (unseen): about NT$20 billion extra in 2026, NT$60 billion budgeted for 2027. The future — the global budget keeps rising (unseen): passes NT$1 trillion for the first time in 2027, about NT$55 billion more than in 2026. Bottom line: the numbers are public; what is hidden is not the numbers but the bill. Sources: visits, TTV (23 May 2023); top-ups and global budget, United Daily News (24 September 2026); general budget, Commercial Times (14 August 2026); point values, UDN Global Vision (2026).
These numbers are all public; the authorities and the National Health Insurance Committee state them clearly. What is hidden is not the numbers but the bill: it is shared out beyond the counter — onto hospitals, into tax bills, and into the future. Holding the premium rate still looks like caring for everyone at cut point 1; at cut point 2, hospitals’ point values may be diluted, and emergency and critical care and surgery, which consume staff and risk, may not keep their resources; at cut point 3, the global budget passes NT$1 trillion, and the gap is filled from tax revenue.
But to be fair, the other side is also true. According to Ministry of Health and Welfare statistics, Taiwan’s national health expenditure was 7.34% of GDP in 2024 [27], lower than most comparable countries; some commentators argue that the problem with Taiwan’s health care is not that it spends too much, but that it treats saving money as its top value, so that reasonable needs crowd each other out within too little funding [28]. As for the high number of outpatient visits, an early report by the Bureau of National Health Insurance analysed possible causes including fee-for-service payment and the habit of seeing a doctor early for minor illnesses, so that hospital admissions are relatively fewer [29].
The two views actually point to the same thing: resources are limited, and trade-offs are unavoidable. Every system rations health care; the difference is only whether it does so by price, by queue, or in an invisible way such as point values. Visible rationing can be discussed and adjusted; invisible rationing is hard to discuss and hard to correct.
5. Set the rules before the game; do not change the score after it
The sports field is one of the few places where everyone agrees on what “fair” looks like.
Sport is about procedural fairness: the same rules, the same referee, the same starting line. There are winners and losers, and nobody thinks it unfair.
But sport also looks after the weaker side. Boxing and judo have weight classes, Go has handicap stones, and professional leagues let the teams with the worst records pick new players first. All of these narrow the gap — the difference is that they are all set before the game, published in advance and the same for everyone; nobody has ever changed the score to a draw after the final whistle.
So the real dividing line is not just “procedural fairness” against “fairness of outcome,” but rules before the game, score after it. Adjust the rules before the game, and everyone can adjust their preparation and play the next game in earnest; change the score after the game, and nobody will play the next one in earnest. Freezing prices and keeping zombie firms alive are both changing the score after the game.
JIAHON Think Tank’s “The Self-Driving Car Paradox” makes the same point in a different setting: cities do not need smarter cars; they need smarter rules.
Figure 6: Set the rules before the game; do not change the score after it — sport also looks after the weaker side, but all of it is set before the game starts, published in advance and the same for everyone. Before the game, rules can be adjusted: weight classes (boxing and judo grouped by body weight); Go handicap stones (the weaker player places several stones first); draft order (the team with the worst record picks new players first) — published in advance, the same for everyone. After the game, the score is not changed: at the final whistle, a 3–1 scoreboard, with a crossed-out 2–2 beneath it; nobody changes it to a draw after the whistle. Freezing selling prices and keeping zombie firms alive = changing the score after the game. Bottom line: adjust the rules before the game and the next game is still played in earnest; change the score after the game and nobody plays the next one in earnest.
Table 2: Rules set before the game, scores changed after it — four settings
| Setting | Rules set before the game | Score changed after the game |
|---|---|---|
| Sport | Weight classes, Go handicap stones, draft order | Nobody does this |
| Markets | Published quality standards, delivery penalties | Freezing selling prices, keeping loss-making companies alive |
| Management | Appraisal criteria made clear in advance | After the appraisal, “let’s just average everyone out” |
| Purchasing | Specifications and scoring method published before the tender | Changing the specifications or the weighting after bids are opened |
6. Thunder and rain alike are Heaven’s grace
Fairness in management also has to be looked at from different cut points.
The old saying holds that thunder and rain alike are Heaven’s grace: punishment is like thunder, care is like rain, and both are grace. In management, it describes two hands of the same heart.
Only rain and never thunder is putting out every fire: every mistake a subordinate makes is blocked by the manager, and every problem is cleaned up by someone else. At cut point 1, all is harmony; by cut point 3, the person has not grown any ability, the dead wood in the team piles up, and the day the manager is away, it burns as a great fire. “Who Would Wear the Crown Must Bear Its Weight” said that a principal’s real job is to make the company able to stand without them; a manager who blocks every small fire for their subordinates is doing exactly the opposite.
Only thunder and never rain is the other extreme: no direction, no resources, no time, only results — no reasons, no excuses. An army can work this way because everyone has been through the same training and shares the same foundation; in industry, managers and subordinates have received completely different professional training. Thunder without ever having given rain is not called setting standards; it is called venting.
Good management is prescribed burning: first give direction, resources and time to find the way, then let the results return to the person who made the decision. The rules on the table are the same for everyone; the support behind the scenes differs from person to person — rules before the game, rain according to need. Thunder lets the small fires burn first; rain lets the new seedlings grow. Without thunderbolt methods, a bodhisattva’s heart cannot show.
Figure 7: Thunder and rain — four ways of fighting fire in management. Rain = direction, resources and time to find the way (horizontal axis, little to much); thunder = letting results return to the decision-maker (vertical axis, weak to strong). Top left, thunder only: no direction, no resources, only results, “no reasons, no excuses”; thunder without rain is venting. Top right, prescribed burning (thunder and rain alike are Heaven’s grace): first give direction, resources and time to find the way, then let results return to the decision-maker; the rules are the same for everyone, the support differs by person. Bottom left, letting it burn: no direction and no questions about results; whatever burns, burns. Bottom right, putting out every fire: every mistake is blocked by the manager; cut point 1, all harmony; cut point 3, one spark and it is a great fire.
7. What it means for the mid-stream supply chain (the core of this article)
The supply chain is also full of frozen prices.
Annual price-downs: the chicken price frozen, feed still rising
Many electronics manufacturers require annual price-downs from their suppliers: the selling price is adjusted down by a fixed few percentage points every year. At cut point 1, purchasing’s cost report looks very good. But raw materials, freight and labour do not follow the annual price-down. A supplier whose selling price is frozen while costs keep rising will do what the poultry farms did in 1973 — not necessarily killing chicks, but switching materials, cutting inspection, shortening after-sales support, or simply exiting. At cut point 2, the ones left are often the ones willing to cut corners; at cut point 3, it is one quality incident or one material shortage, and the bill is paid all at once.
“Reflections on a Typhoon Night” divides this into two layers: the figures in revenue and reports are products, while quality and delivery are conditions. Price cuts can cut waste, but they cannot cut conditions — once the conditions move, every dollar saved will later be paid back with interest. Switch materials far enough and you may end up with unbranded consumables with no clear responsibility; “The Devil Is in the Details” set out their three breaking points: specification drift, batches that cannot be traced, and responsibility that cannot be assigned.
Free samples: setting the price to zero
Free things are overused, and samples are no exception. When samples cost nothing, a customer asks five suppliers for one each to compare; every one of them pays the cost of making the sample, and only one gets the order. The costs of the other four do not disappear; they are spread into the quotations these suppliers give all their customers. “Stood Up Again by a New Supplier?” told the other half: suppliers are doing their sums too, and if eight out of ten quotations come to nothing, they will push your priority further down the list. JIAHON’s practice is to agree the price first and send samples second: the price is settled first, and the sample is used to confirm the physical item, not as a tool for comparing prices.
All-inclusive warranties: going back to correct our own promise
At the end of the previous article, “Paid Out, So Why Keep It Confidential?”, JIAHON said: when customers who hand their purchasing to JIAHON meet a warranty dispute, JIAHON will help establish the cause and will bear the cost as far as possible. Now we ask ourselves the same question with the same measuring stick: and then what?
If JIAHON swallows everything and says nothing, at cut point 1 the customer is very satisfied; at cut point 2, the production line does not know where the problem lies, and the same operation in the same environment breaks the same part again; at cut point 3, JIAHON has become the one blocking fires for the customer’s process, while the fuel keeps piling up on the customer’s production line. That is putting out every fire, not partnership.
So this promise needs one more sentence: we bear the cost, and we always attach the root cause.
If it is our material, we replace it and we own it; if it is a problem of operating conditions or process, we say so as it is, with evidence attached. The root cause is sometimes unwelcome to hear, but it is the one way to let small fires burn first instead of storing up a great one. Only when the root cause is written down does it save more than this one time; “When the Master Technician Retires, Does Yield Fall Too?” puts it directly: documents are not the goal; ending repeated mistakes is.
Figure 8: Three cut points in the mid-stream supply chain — annual price-downs, free samples and all-inclusive warranties all look good at cut point 1 (green: looks good; amber: turning point; red: looks bad). Annual price-downs: purchasing’s cost report looks very good; suppliers switch materials, cut inspection, shorten after-sales support or exit; one quality incident or material shortage, and the bill is paid all at once. Free samples: asking five suppliers for one each makes comparison easy; four suppliers’ sampling costs are spread into their quotations; all customers pay that money together. All-inclusive warranties: the customer is satisfied and there is no dispute; the production line does not know the root cause, and the same mistake recurs; fuel builds up on the customer’s production line. JIAHON’s practice: agree the price first, send samples second; on warranties, bear the cost and always attach the root cause.
Three cut-point questions for purchasing. Before the next negotiation over an annual price-down, the next request for samples or the next warranty you sign, ask once each: who gains from this condition at cut point 1? How will the other side adjust at cut point 2? By cut point 3, who will the bill fall on? “Multi-Faceted Thinking” said that the purchase price is only the down payment on the price; “Professional Integration Lowers Total Cost of Ownership” breaks the later instalments into three items: the time spent comparing prices and requesting quotations, the administration of reconciling accounts and inspecting deliveries, and the trial and error of buying the wrong specification.
8. Humanity progresses slowly
Knowing is not the same as changing.
The White House tapes compiled by the economists Abrams and Butkiewicz show that Nixon said in private in February 1971 that wage and price controls simply do not work [16]; half a year later he announced the freeze anyway, and it was hugely popular [14]. The people making decisions do not necessarily fail to see the second cut point — it is just that the cut point where the bill comes due falls after the election.
The forests are the same. The 10 a.m. policy was formally abolished in 1978 [9]; in the summer of 2026, the US Forest Service again made full suppression the default strategy for every new fire. Critics see this as bringing back the old rule that had been rejected; the chief of the Forest Service said there was no commitment to the 10 a.m. next-day deadline [30]. The same lesson, more than ninety years on, is being taught again.
JIAHON Think Tank measured the same kind of gap in “Catalogue Speed Is Not Your Speed”: a new technology lags roughly five to fifteen years between “it can be done” and “it is actually in use”; what the four sources of friction have in common is that the bottleneck is people, not technology.
Human progress is slow not because nobody knows, but because every generation has to resist surface fairness all over again, at its own cut point 1.
The forest fire is not wrong; what is wrong is judging only at the moment the fire breaks out.
Surface fairness holds only at cut point 1.
Move to after one round of responses, or to a generation later, and the same decision hands the bill to someone else: to farmers, to healthy companies, to hospitals and tax bills, to the next generation, and to the next link in the supply chain.
Look at anything at least three times: when it happens, after one round of responses, and a generation later.
Set the rules before the game, do not change the score after it; let small fires burn first, and do not store up a great one.
Frequently asked questions
What are “time cut points”?
Looking at the same event once when it happens, once after one round of responses, and once a generation later. Fairness that holds only at the first cut point, and hands the bill to someone else later, is what JIAHON Think Tank calls “surface fairness.”
Why are small forest fires not the enemy?
From 1935 the US Forest Service required every wildfire to be put out by 10 a.m. the next morning; over decades fuel built up, and the few fires that could not be put out burned all the larger. The policy was formally abolished in 1978, replaced by managed fire and prescribed burning. Nearly 80% of the forest in Yellowstone National Park is lodgepole pine, which has a kind of cone that opens only above 45°C.
What do annual price-downs have to do with the 1973 US price freeze?
In 1973 wholesale and retail chicken prices were frozen while feed kept rising, and poultry farms suffocated and drowned about a million chicks. Annual price-downs in the supply chain are the same mechanism: the selling price is cut every year while raw materials, freight and labour keep rising, so suppliers switch materials, cut inspection, shorten after-sales support or exit.
What is a zombie firm, and why does “not letting fall what should fall” hurt an industry?
A zombie firm is a company that survives only on bank roll-over loans or subsidies, its core business long unable to service its debts. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap’s 2008 study of Japan found that the more zombie firms an industry had, the more stagnant its job creation and the lower its productivity, and the less willing healthy firms were to invest.
How does JIAHON handle warranty disputes?
We bear the cost, and we always attach the root cause: if it is JIAHON’s material, JIAHON replaces it and owns it; if it is a problem of operating conditions or process, we explain it as it is, with evidence attached, so that the same problem does not happen again.
References
[1] Sowell, T. Applied Economics: Thinking Beyond Stage One. Basic Books, first edition 2004, revised and enlarged edition 2008 (Smithies’s questioning is in Chapter 1; the book is dedicated to Smithies). en.wikipedia.org
[2] US National Park Service (NPS). “Ecological Consequences of Fire” (lodgepole pine makes up nearly 80% of Yellowstone’s forest; the cones need more than 45°C to open; animal populations after the fires). nps.gov
[3] US National Park Service (NPS). “The 1988 Fires” (about 794,000 acres affected, 36% of the park). nps.gov
[4] USDA Forest Service, Fire Effects Information System (FEIS). Pinus contorta var. latifolia (one year after the 1988 fires, nearly a third of plants were lodgepole pine seedlings). fs.usda.gov
[5] Forest History Society. “U.S. Forest Service Fire Suppression” (the 1910 fires; the 1935 10 a.m. policy; the shift in research from the 1960s). foresthistory.org
[6] USDA Forest Service (2021). RMRS-GTR-428 (before 1935, suppression was limited by manpower and technology; from 1935, the era of excluding all wildfire). fs.usda.gov
[7] PBS American Experience. “Fighting Wildfires” (control by 10 a.m. on the morning after discovery; fuel build-up). pbs.org
[8] Calkin, D. E., Cohen, J. D., Finney, M. A. & Thompson, M. P. (2014). “How risk management can prevent future wildfire disasters in the wildland-urban interface.” PNAS 111(2): 746–751 (suppression success rate of 95%–98%). See also CalMatters (August 2026). fs.usda.gov; calmatters.org
[9] Headwaters Economics. “Federal wildfire policy and the legacy of suppression” (in 1971 the target became controlling each fire within 10 acres); Taxpayers for Common Sense. “Reigniting the 10 A.M. Mistake” (adopted in 1935, formally abolished in 1978). Note: some reports date the 10 a.m. policy to 1933; this article follows the US Forest Service and the Forest History Society in dating it to 1935. headwaterseconomics.org; taxpayer.net
[10] Sci-Tech Vista. “Revisiting 2012 (1): A rational look at forest fires” (prescribed burning; suppressing every forest fire as a disaster builds up fuel; Chinese-language). scitechvista.nat.gov.tw
[11] Romme, W. H. & Despain, D. G. (1989). “Historical perspective on the Yellowstone fires of 1988.” BioScience 39(10): 695–699; Romme, W. H. et al. (2011). “Twenty Years After the 1988 Yellowstone Fires.” Ecosystems 14(7): 1196–1215; Schoennagel, T., Veblen, T. T. & Romme, W. H. (2004). “The interaction of fire, fuels, and climate across Rocky Mountain forests.” BioScience 54(7). frames.gov
[12] Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian, “Biography of Wu Zixu”; Zhang Shoujie, Zhengyi commentary on the Records of the Grand Historian. zh.wikisource.org; ctext.org
[13] Ministry of Education, Dictionary of Chinese Idioms. Entry for “the many overcome Heaven” (Chinese-language). dict.idioms.moe.edu.tw
[14] EBSCO Research Starters. “Ninety-day freeze on wages and prices” (announced 15 August 1971); Cato Institute. “Remembering Nixon’s Wage and Price Controls” (75% approval in polls; second freeze in June 1973; cattle held back from market, shelves stripped bare). ebsco.com; cato.org
[15] TIME (1973). “CONTROLS: A Threat of Food Shortage” (wholesale and retail chicken prices frozen while feed kept rising; about a million chicks suffocated and drowned). time.com
[16] Abrams, B. A. & Butkiewicz, J. L. (2017). “The political economy of wage and price controls: evidence from the Nixon tapes.” Public Choice 170(1–2): 63–78; summary at Econlib (December 2016). ideas.repec.org; econlib.org
[17] Caballero, R. J., Hoshi, T. & Kashyap, A. K. (2008). “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan.” American Economic Review 98(5): 1943–1977. aeaweb.org
[18] Chicago Booth Review. “Zombie Lending in Japan” (Kashyap: in Japan, firms never exit). chicagobooth.edu
[19] Smiles, S. (1859). Self-Help, opening of Chapter 1. gutenberg.org
[20] Executive Yuan. “National Health Insurance” (enrolment rate about 99.9%; Chinese-language). ey.gov.tw
[21] Mirror Media (19 November 2025). “NHI global budget nears NT$1 trillion; premium rate confirmed unchanged next year” (rate held at 5.17% for 2026; Chinese-language). mirrormedia.mg
[22] Commercial Times (14 August 2026). “NHI global budget to pass NT$1 trillion for the first time next year” (the government has expanded general-budget top-ups since 2023; about NT$20 billion added in 2026; Chinese-language). ctee.com.tw
[23] United Daily News (24 September 2026). Minister of Health and Welfare Shih Chung-liang on NHI finances for 2027: global budget passes NT$1 trillion for the first time, up about NT$55 billion; NT$60 billion top-up budgeted by the government; premium rate held at 5.17%; year-end reserve about 2.3 months (Chinese-language). udn.com
[24] TTV News (23 May 2023). “The truth about NHI: its finances need reform” (Shih Chung-liang, then director-general of the NHI Administration: about 15 doctor visits per person a year in Taiwan, about 7 in OECD countries; Chinese-language). news.ttv.com.tw
[25] UDN Global Vision (2026). “Is seeing a doctor in Taiwan cheap? Taiwan and Japan both use point-value systems” (Chinese-language). global.udn.com
[26] Lien Hsien-ming (2017). “Economics 543: Administrative costs among the world’s lowest? The big hole behind Taiwan’s NHI miracle,” CommonWealth Magazine (Chinese-language). cw.com.tw
[27] Ministry of Health and Welfare (February 2026). National Health Expenditure, 2024 (national health expenditure 7.34% of GDP in 2024; Chinese-language). mohw.gov.tw
[28] Yeh Hsu-lin (2020). “In international context and by the statistics, does Taiwan really spend too much on health care and NHI?,” The Reporter (Chinese-language). twreporter.org
[29] Bureau of National Health Insurance. “A comparison of National Health Insurance with health-care systems in other countries” (possible reasons for the high number of outpatient visits; Chinese-language). nhi.gov.tw
[30] The Colorado Sun (24 August 2026). The full-suppression strategy and the Forest Service chief’s explanation of the 10 a.m. deadline. coloradosun.com
[31] This article restates foreign-language and news sources in the author’s own words; figures follow the original sources. NHI financial figures are the explanations and projections of the competent authorities and will be updated each year.
Note
This is an opinion article. Cases and data come from public sources and reports; citations follow the references at the end. NHI financial figures are projections by the competent authorities and related meetings; where new announcements exist, current data prevail. The comments in this article on systems and phenomena are JIAHON Think Tank’s position, and do not constitute an accusation against any particular person or institution, nor medical, legal or investment advice.
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